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Abstract
We show that under asymetric information, if the government holds advanced information
relative to the investorssome debt management policies may lead to bond market instability.
The In particular, we show that the repurchase/reissuance strategy assumd in most of the
current debt management literature would cause such a crisis and it would be therefore highly
suboptimal.
1 Introduction
In this note we describe an informational mechanism that may lead debt managers not to buy back
their debt before redemption. The repurchase/reissuance strategy (r/r) assumed by most of the
literature on optimal debt management (DM) are an out of equilibrium path event.
One of the main concerns of debt management o¢ ces (DMO) in practice is not to undertake
operations that will destabilize the bond market. In fact market stability is often in the DMO
mandates. There is, however, little academic research on how a DMO may destabilize a bond
market. The standard assumption is that all bond issuances are always fully repaid, under rational
expectations investors should know that a default is impossible in these models. The key to the
example below is an informational asymetry between government and investors: government knows
about a future default ahead of investors. This informational asymmetry is similar in spirit to Myers
and Majluf (1984), highly inuential in corporate nance.1
If investors know that the government has superior information regarding future scal positions,
they would interpret a r/r operation negatively and bond markets would shut down. This would
be a disastrous outcome for the government. Since the benets of r/r are small in equilibrium the
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1Myers and Majluf (1984) use asymetric information to explain that equity issuance is very rare. They consider a
rm that has superior information to investors. There will be occasions when existing shareholders lose more through
a reduction in their current share price than they gain from undertaking a new project with positive NPV. Incumbent
investors are aware of the asymmetry of information and so respond positively to a rm not issuing new equity to
fund new projects.
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government does not buyback debt until maturity. An r/r would cause the bond market to shut
down due to a lemons problem so these operations do not take place.
The model also gives some insights about when a "pure buyback" (that is, a repurchase without
reissuance) might take place. If the government is in a path of debt reduction a repurchase is needed
to reduce the stock of long bonds outstanding in order to lower total debt. In this case a repurchase
does not cause a bond crisis as agents understand there is a good reason for it. So the repurchases
of US bonds observed around 2001-02 can be rationalized within the model as well.
The model presented below shows the simplest case we could nd where r/r never occurs due to
asymetric information. To display the e¤ect as clearly as possible we use a utility function for which
scal insurance is not available. Also, the model is extreme in that a tiny amount of repurchases
trigger a bond crisis with certainty. In a more elaborate model we would have that agentsperceived
probability of a bond crisis is an increasing function of repurchases, this is captured by the transaction
cost function we use in section 6 on optimal repurchases in Faraglia, Marcet, Oikonomou and Scott
(2017) (FMOS).
One additional virtue of the example below is that it further justies the issuance of short bonds.
Under the informational asymmetry considered a commitment to issue short bonds in the future is
a way of evenly distributing debt maturities so that the government reduces its own incentives to
default in any given period. Therefore the issuance of short bonds lowers the perceived probability
of default, so that absence of r/r is in line with the main message provided in the paper, namely,
that there are good reasons for issuing short bonds.
A three-period Model
We present a three-period version of the main model in FMOS with linear utility of consumption,
asymetric information, early determination of taxes and endogenous repurchases of previously issued
long bonds.
More precisely, the di¤erences with the model in FMOS are:
-Government and investors live for 3 periods t = 0; 1; 2:
-Two maturities are issued, S = 1 and N = 2: For simplicity we introduce a constraint b10 = 0.
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Obviously b21 = 0; so the only bonds to issue are (long) bonds b
2
0 (short) bonds b
1
1:
Let R() be the tax revenue achieved each period when taxes are  : R will be determined in
equilibrium below.
-Tax rates  t applied in period t are chosen one period in advance. Therefore  0 is given at t = 0
but the government chooses  1;  2 given information available at t = 0; 1.
-At t = 0 there is a stock of previously issued bonds b2 2; b
1
 1; b
2
 1: Denote as G0 = g0 + b
2
 2 + b
1
 1
total government outlays at t = 0. There are b2 1 > 0 long bonds outstanding at t = 0; they may be
repurchased by the government at competitive prices at t = 0 or they may be left in private hands
until they mature at t = 1: We assume G0 > R( 0) so that the government will have to issue gross
debt at t = 0:
-Information Structure: Investors know government spending one period in advance, but govern-
ment has even better information and it knows spending two periods in advance. Formally, both
2This simplies analysis as it implies that positive repurchases R0 > 0 clearly imply a reissuance of long bonds and
it avoids solving for a portfolio of bonds in period 0, thus we can focus on the issue of repurchases.
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investors and the government know (G0; g1; b2 1;  0) at t = 0; and the government knows in addition
g2 at t = 0: Investors only become aware of g2 in period t = 1. Investors do observe government
policy at t = 0; in other words they observe long bond repurchases R0:
Budget constraints of the government in periods t = 0; 1; 2 are, respectively
G0 +R0p
1
0 = R( 0) + b20 p20
g1 + b
2
 1  R0 = R( 1) + b11 p11
g2 +
 
b20 + b
1
1

(1  h) = R( 2)(1)
where R0 denote repurchases in period t = 0 of previously issued long bonds. The government can
choose a haircut h; which has to be applied uniformly to all maturities.
In addition we introduce the following constraints
0  R0  b2 1;(2)
1  h  0(3)
b20; b
1
1  0
The bounds on repurchases hold by denition. Given that taxes are set one period in advance and the
assumption G0 > R( 0) it is clear that R0 amounts to a r/r operation: a repurchase R0 > 0 mucst
be nanced with a higher issuance of b20: Given the objective function detailed below the haircut h
will only take values 0 or 1 in equilibrium.
To summarize, scal variables (G0;  0; b2 1) are given at t = 0: The government chooses ( 1;  2; R0; b
2
0,b
1
1; h)
at t = 0 subject to (1) and (2) given information on (g2).
Investors
Given the information structure detailed above the only random variable in this 3-period model
is g2; which is not observed by investors at t = 0. Before observing R0 investors perceive that g2 has
distribution F Ig2 : This may or may not be the true distribution of g2:
Since the government chooses R0 contingent on g2 repurchases, investors will try to extract rele-
vant information about g2 from their observation on R0:We specialize investors utility u(c) = c: This
utility simplies the analysis of 3-period model and it highlights the role of asymetric information.3
Therefore investors maximize
EI0
 
2X
t=0
t [ct + v(xt)]
R0
!
The budget constraint of investors is analogous to (1) and we do not write it. Their choices at t = 0
are a function of R0 as well as the given constants (G0;  0; g1). Their choices in period t = 1 are a
function, in addition, of g2: Agentsexpectation EI0 are taken given investorsinformation and their
perceived distribution F Ig2 . Investors have rational expectations in that they know how g2 maps into
prices and government choices. Given information on (G0;  0; g1; R0; b20) they make forecasts about
future values of g2 and (potentially) bond prices at t = 1:
3For this utility function the yield curve is at so that scal insurance as in Angeletos, Buera and Nicolini can not
be achieved. Therefore this utility provides a stark result about how r/r may destabilize markets as there are no scal
insurance benets from policy. We discuss the e¤ects of generalizing this utility function below.
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Government
The government understands that equilibrium  t = 1  vx;t hence equilibrium labor supply for a
tax rate  is L()  T   v0 1(1  ) and tax revenue R()  L():
The government takes pricing functions, as a function of g2; as given.4
We now make two additional assumptions that we number for future reference
Assumption 1 The La¤er curve R() has a unique maximum, denoted Rmax attained at some
interior tax 0 < max < 1. Furthermore, R is increasing in [0; max]:
This holds for most utility functions used in the literature, for example, for v(x) =  B (T x)l+1
l+1
;
with B; l > 0:
Let Pr obI0 denote investorsperceived probabilities at time t = 0: Let us assume parameter values
are such that, in equilibrium investors perceive that there will be gross debt issuance at t = 1; namely
Pr obI0(b
1
1 > 0) = 1:
For su¢ ciently high initial debt this holds with most utility functions as it is necessary for tax
smoothing without default.
Investors know that for realizations of g2 such that
(4) g2 > Rmax  G0 +R( 0):
default is inevitable, since this inequality implies
g2 > R( 2) 
 
b20 + b
1
1

therefore h > 0. Let the probability of "inevitable default" be the investorsperceived probability
that (4) holds. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 INEV > 0:
In other words, we assume that investors think that the government may have no option but
to default in period 2 with positive probability. Most papers on scal policy in modern economics
simply assume that the government only issues debt guaranteeing that INEV = 0. But this can only
be seen as a convenient simplication, for a reasonably calibrated support of g and given existing
levels of government debt events such as (4) have positive probability. The standard denition would
then imply that no equilibrium exists, while we consider here a situation where an equilibrium exists
and, in some periods, the government may default.
As in the rest of the paper the government maximizes the utility of consumers but, in addition,
it receives a penalty for defaulting and it maximizes
(5)
2X
t=0
t [ct + v(lt)]  I+(h)
4Later we introduce the possibility that the government understands how its own actions about r/r may change
bond pricing functions this will not change any conclusion.
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where h is a haircut that takes place in the last period t = 2, I+ the indicator function of the positive
real line.5 ;6
As standard with models of optimal policy when the government has superior information we
assume the government maximizes the "true" utility of the agent given the governments superior
information, so the above discounted sum is maximized with knowledge of g2.
Equilibrium
We keep the assumption of Ramsey equilibrium as in the main model of the paper. Here, equi-
librium bond prices are a function (p10; p
2
0, p
1
1) mapping g2 into R
3
+ such that if investors take it as
given and if investors know the joint distribution of g2 conditional on R0. We will also denote the
scal policy variables as functions of g2.
Given the objective function of the government, Once the government incurs in a haircut it will
incur in the largest possible haircut, as this allows the government to lower taxes and lower the
distortion, so that h(g2) = 0 or 1. Standard arguments we have that in equilibrium
p10 = 
p20 = 
2
p11(g2) = (1  h(g2))
The rst line follows from our assumption that there is no default at t = 1: The second line takes
into account that from the investorspoint of view bonds will be repaid at t = 2 with probability
  Pr obI(h(g2) = 0 j R0; b20); where this conditional probability combines the marginal distribution
F Ig2 with knowledge of the equilibrium function h(g2). Since g2 is known to agents at t = 1; the
equation for p11(g2) says that if the government plans to exercise a haircut at t = 2; i.e. h(g2) = 1;
there will be a bond crisis at t = 1 as soon as agents observe the value of g2:
In the full information economy and if INEV = 0 then  = 1 and p20 = 
2. It is easy to
see that in this case a repurchase at t = 0 plays the same role as issuing short bonds in period
t = 1 : any portfolio with positive repurchases eR0 2 (0; b2 1] achieves the same tax allocation as a
portfolio without repurchase R0 = 0 and additional short bond issuance eb11 = eR0=. Therefore under
full information the optimal allocation is indeterminate, positive repurchases are compatible with
optimality, they imply higher short bond issuance at t = 1; and they can happen in equilibrium.
But since since   1  INEV Assumption 2 gives  < 1 hence in this economy long bonds sell
at a discount. If the government observes a g2 that is fully fundable (ie. such that h(g2) = 0) an
r/r is costly because it involves re-issuing cheap long bonds. Algebraically, if h(g2) = 0 the budget
constraint at t = 2 can be written as
g2 +

G0  R( 0)
2
+
g1 + b
2
 1  R( 1)

+
1
2

1

  1

R0

= R( 2)
5Most papers considering haircuts assume there is a discontinuity at h = 0 of the penalty for a haircut, that is,
there is a xed cost of not repaying. That the haircut enters as an indicator function is an extreme version of this case
and it simplies our analysis.
6Note that we have included the term t = 0 in the discounted sum for analogy with the utility function of the rest
of the paper. The attentive reader will notice that this term is actually a given constant and it can be dropped out
from the objective function.
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and since

1
2
  1


choosing a R0 > 0 only increases  2 hence it is suboptimal relative to R0 = 0.
On the other hand if g2 is such that h(g2) = 1 and  > 0 the government would nd it optimal
to repurchase long bonds. Raising one unit of R0 now lowers the bill at t = 1 and, since there will
be a haircut (and this is known to the government) the additional reissuance of long bonds at t = 0
actually costs nothing. Algebraically, the budget constraints at t = 1; 2 now imply
g1 + b
2
 1  R0 = R( 1)
g2 = R( 2)
so that the government would set R0 as large as possible (= b2 1) so as to lower  1 without a cost
for  2: Therefore a R0 > 0 would signal to investors that a default is on the way, given knowledge
of the equilibrium functions this would imply  = 0 and there would be a bond crisis: Therefore in
equilibrium R0 = 0:
Therefore, under the possibility of default, even if  is close to 1 (ie, possibility of default is small)
an r/r would magnify this probability and cause a bond crisis, as it gives the wrong signal to agents.
This proves
Result In the 3-period model considered in this note, under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have that
R0 = 0:
Repurchases if Debt is Decreasing
It is easy to see that repurchases will actually occur if the government is in a path of debt
reduction. For this one just has to extend the above analysis to the case when R ( 0) > G0. In this
case a repurchase is desirable as it just helps smooth taxes since it lowers the debt burden in period
1. Therefore h(g2) = 0 is compatible with R0 > 0 and no bond market crisis occurs upon observing
R0 > 0:
This last point explains why some repurchases were observed in years 2000 and 2001, when the
US government was running surpluses.
Generalizations
Although we have kept the analysis as simple as possible it should be clear that zero repurchases
are going to be optimal under many generalizations.
For example, if the government understands how investors peceived proability of default changes
upon observing a given value of R0: The result of this equilibrium concept is the same as the one we
use above and it keeps R0 = 0.
The above argument proving R0 = 0 rests on the fact that long bonds are costly because  < 1:
There are many other reasons in the real world why repurchases are costly. We have detailed them in
section 6 of FMOS. Introducing transaction costs, liquidity value of bonds, small/uncertain benets
of r/r would only reinforce our argument.
Derivatives
Finally, a comment on derivatives. There is a view that even if r/r are unlikely because they
involve large market intervention one could generate the same porftolio with appropriate derivatives
that imply a small market intervention. In practice some DMOs have issued derivatives, while others
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(notably the British DMO) has not. In an informal conversation a British DMO o¢ cer told us they
thought that issuing derivatives might destabilize markets.
Derivatives are controversial and costly for many reasons. Under the asymmetric information
setup considered above derivatives would destabilize bond markets in exactly the same way that a
repurchase would do: a derivative is also equivalent with a future issuance of short bonds, so it may
send the message that a government is planning on defaulting. Therefore issuing derivatives can
destabilize markets.
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